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THE SOCIAL SUMMIT AND THE SOCIAL SITUATION' 
I: INTRODUCTION: SUMMIT OBJECTIVES 
The three core objectives of the Social Summit are: the reduction and elimination of 
widespread poverty; increasing productive employment and the reduction of unemployment; and 
social integration. These objectives are believed to be "closely interwoven within a tapestry of 
values", without which neither individuals nor societies can truly develop. The fundamental 
policy concerns which arise therefrom, at both the national and international level, are: how to 
promote high rates of economic growth; how to translate this growth into job expansion; and, 
how to achieve balance between creating jobs and improving the quality of jobs. It is taken as 
axiomatic that in order to achieve these Summit objectives, an unprecedented degree of 
international cooperation will have to be forthcoming. 
From the standpoint of the Commonwealth Caribbean, pursuit of the Social Summit 
objectives can be seen as driven by two fundamental considerations. One of these is how to 
promote the maximum possible consensus at the international level, on which policies should be 
adopted and pursued by the international community in order to set in train a process of 
sustainable human development, worldwide. For the region, this requires a conscious effort to 
moderate claims to uniqueness and also to modify inclinations toward "exceptionalism" and 
against "universalism". This would not be an easy task in a region with our intellectual 
traditions, and where the particular distinctiveness of its population, size, geography, cultural 
diversity and history is so obvious. However, the task of building global consensus and 
universalist values around an acceptable minimum package of international and national policies 
is very vital to the long term strategic interests of the region. 
'Research assistance in the preparation of this document was provided by Ms Andrea Foo, 
Research Assistant, IDS, University of Guyana. 
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The other consideration is how to translate this consensus when arrived at into "nuts and 
bolts proposals". That is, how to design proposals which are concrete and implementable, while 
at the same time providing the modalities for their monitoring, review and follow-up. 
There are certain obvious similarities in the social situations of individual countries in 
the region and a sufficient convergence of long term outlook to support the thesis that a common 
regional position on the Summit objectives is vitally important to all countries. The similarities 
in the social situations are rooted in size, degree of openness and dependence, history, culture, 
outlook and characteristic forms of individual and social behaviour. They are also clearly 
reinforced in the joint endeavour of developing Caricom. The search however, for common 
regional positions, should not be allowed to mask vital intra-regional differences. Already 
in some quarters, there is a tendency to reduce not only the region, but all the countries of the 
South, into one or two basic typologies. This would inevitably lead to badly designed solutions. 
In what follows, the social situation and circumstances of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad 
& Tobago are analysed and disaggregated with the aim of advancing "nuts and bolts proposals" 
for incorporation in presentations by regional representatives to the World Summit for Social 
Development. 
II: THE SOCUL SITUATION 
In this Section the social situation in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago is analysed 
in terms of seven classes of indicators, namely, population and geography; the standard-of-
living; the social sectors; employment and unemployment; poverty; income distribution; and, 
governance. 
A. POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHY 
Frequently, it is not fully appreciated the extent to which for purposes of cross-country 
comparisons world-wide, the most fundamental descriptors still remain, population and 
geography. In relation to both, all three territories of the region would be classed as small on 
a world scale, as their combined population is just about 4.5 million persons, and the land area 
only about 231,000 square kilometers. Within these totals however, differences among the 
countries are quite striking (See Table 1). The population of Jamaica (2.5 million) is about 
twice that of Trinidad & Tobago (1.3 million) and about three and one-half times larger than 
Guyana (0.7 million). The land area distribution is also skewed. Guyana alone accounts for 93 
percent of the total, with Jamaica having only 5 percent and Trinidad & Tobago the remainder 
(2 percent). 
For most of the past two and a half decades, the population of Guyana has been on the 
decline; while in Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, population growth rates have ranged between 
one and 1.3 percent (see Table 1). In all three territories, however, the rates of urbanisation 
have been high, including Guyana, where the population has been decreasing. At present, the 
urban population as a percent of the total, in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, is 35, 
58, and 67 percent respectively. 
Ethnicity and cultural factors within each territory's population also vary considerably. 
Guyana has seven major ethnic groups defined in its census: Negro or Black, East Indian, 
Chinese, Amerindian, White, Mixed and Others. It has more than the others, although Trinidad 
& Tobago with its Indo-Trinidadian, Afro-Trinidadian and French-Creole population, is more 
ethnically diverse than Jamaica. 
Table 1 
Population Statistics 
Indicator Guyana Jamaica Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1. Population (million) 0.7m 2.5m 1.3m 
2. Rates of Growth of Population 
A 1970-80 0.4 1.3 1.1 
B 1980-90 -0.1 1.3 1.3 
C 1990-94 -0.1 1.0 1.1 
3. Rate of Growth of Urban 
Population 
A: 1970-80 2.0 2.7 5.0 
B: 1980-90 0.6 2.6 3.1 
C: 1990-94 3.2 3.0 0.7 
4. Population per km̂  3.4 225 253 
5. Population per hectare of 
Agricultural land 0.4 5.2 7.9 
6. Area (km )̂ 214,970 10,991 5,128 
7. Agricultural Area 
('000 hectares) 1,725 475 169 
Source: Various Official Documents. 
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The population-land mass ratios also vary, with population per square kilometer being 
high by global comparisons in Jamaica (225:1) and Trinidad & Tobago (253:1), and low in 
Guyana (3.4:1). The agriculture land area also varies significantly between the countries, with 
Guyana having by far the largest agricultural area available, and because of its relatively small 
population, the lowest ratio of agricultural area to population (see Table 1). These ratios should 
be considered also in relation to the well established variations in natural resource potential 
among the territories. Guyana is well known for its biodiversity potential, forestry, mineral and 
hydro power resources, although the other two territories do have significant natural resource 
potential in bauxite (Jamaica) and hydrocarbons (Trinidad & Tobago). 
Further, the settlement patterns, terrain and size of the island territories favour a far 
larger degree of integration among the population than is the case with Guyana. In these 
territories there is effectively total coverage for road, telephone and facsimiles, radio and 
television communications. But in Guyana, about 90 percent of the settlement is confined to a 
narrow coastal strip accounting for about 3 percent of the land area, alongside the pronounced 
inaccessibility of the hinterland and interior areas and communities. Because of the heavy 
concentration of the indigenous Amerindian population in these parts of the country (and as we 
shall see later, their poverty) the issue of social integration is consequently far more complex 
and difficult to address in Guyana than elsewhere in the region. 
While the territories are all located in the same broad geographical region, Guyana's land 
location raises special geo-political concerns, which are complicated by the existence of border 
disputes with neighbouring countries. Despite combined efforts by all the parties concerned to 
resolve their differences peacefully, the mere existence of this situation complicates an already 
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complex situation in which border communities are plagued by smuggling and the narcotics 
trade. 
On balance, the island territories appear to be more proned to natural disasters than 
Guyana. This is principally due to their location in the hurricane belt. There is also the longrun 
danger of earthquakes, given the geological formation of the islands. Guyana's principal threat 
is from flooding caused by heavy rainfall along the coastal strip, where most of the population 
is concentrated. This area is about six metres below sea-level. 
In sum therefore, population and geography indicators reveal that the region as a 
whole is small in global terms, and made up of diverse ethnic and cultural groups, while 
being subject to signifícant population pressure on available land resources, and the ensuing 
competition which this generates. The picture is, however, not uniform, for considerable 
underutilization of natural resource potential exists in Guyana. Finding ways therefore of 
harnessing this potential would be crucial to the outcomes of regional efforts to eradicate 
widespread poverty and to promote social integration. 
B. THE STANDARD-OF-LTVING 
The most widely used and comprehensive statistical measure of development is the 
United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) which combines three variables: income, 
longevity (health) and knowledge (education). In relation to this index, Trinidad & Tobago is 
highly placed worldwide (35 out of 173 countries), Jamaica at 65 is in the middle range, while 
Guyana is low, 107 (see Table 2). This difference is partly reflected in the different values of 
real per capita GDP among the three countries. Trinidad & Tobago (US$4049 at 1988 prices) 
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has a per capita GDP 2.6 times as large as that of Jamaica and 6.3 times that of Guyana. 
(Table 2). 
All three countries have suffered from sígnifícant decreases in per capita income since 
1970. The compression of income in Guyana, however, was longer lasting and more devastating 
compared to the other two countries. The recent turnaround of its economy, has also been the 
most striking, reflecting no doubt in part, the low base from which recovery started in 1992. 
(see Table 2). 
The behaviour of the exchange rate and consumer prices (linked because of the 
openness of these economies) underscores these problems. Exchange rate depreciation and 
consumer price inflation have been particularly marked in Guyana. In Guyana, the local 
currency required to purchase one US dollar has grown by a factor of 38, since 1984. In 
Jamaica the growth has been by a factor of 10 and in Trinidad & Tobago about 2.5. At the 
same time, inflation rates in Guyana for each year exceeded 25 percent per annum in the period 
1981-1993. For the other territories inflation, although significant, was not as steep. The years 
in which the official exchange rates were either floated or unified with the parallel rates have 
recorded exceptionally high rates of inflation, e.g., Guyana 106 percent in 1992 and Jamaica 51 
and 77 percent respectively for (1992 and 1993). 
Finally, the economic data show high, but varying degrees of external dependence. The 
ratio of exports of goods and non-financial services to GDP in constant dollars is about 80, 56 
and 35 percent respectively for Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. Similarly, the 
disbursed external debt of the three countries are: 2.1, 4.4, and 2.0 billion US dollars, 
respectively, with their respective debt services ratios being 25, 30 and 35 percent in 1993. 
Table 2 
Income, Price, and Openness Indicators 
Indicator Guyana Jamaica Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1. Average Annual Rate of Growth of Per 
Capita GDP 
A. 1970-80 -0.2 -2.0 4.4 
B. 1980-90 -3.7 0.3 -4.2 
C. 1990-93 8.8 0.1 -0.7 
D. 1994^ 8.0 - 4.0 
2. GDP Per Capita for 1993 at US$ Constant 
1988 prices 644 1563 4049 
3. UNDP: H.D.I. 1993 107 65 35 
4. Average Annual Growth of Consumer 
Prices 
A. 1971-80 
B. 1981-90 10.3 18.5 13.2 
C. 1991 33.0 15.1 11.1 
D. 1992 105.9 51.1 3.8 
E. 1993 26.0 77.3 6.5 
F. 1994 7.0 22.0 10.8 
5. Exchange Rate (local currency per US$) 
A . 1984 3.8 3.9 2.4 
B. 1989 27.2 5.7 4.3 
C. 1994^ 144.0 33.0 5.99 
6. Index of Openness (1993) 
A . Exports of goods and services to GDP 80 56 35 
B. External Debt Service Ratios 25 30 35 
C. External Debt/GDP Ratios 271 150 31 
D. Per Capita External Debt ($US) 2800 1800 1500 
Notes: ^Estimate. 
^End of year rate. For other years: period average. 
Source: lADB, Annual reports, Government Statistics (various countries). 
C. THE SOCIAL INDICATORS 
Table 3 shows ten key social indicators for the three countries. The information 
portrayed there, conforms to the standard of living indicators presented in the previous Section. 
Life expectancy in Guyana is about 65 years as compared with 70 + years in the other two 
countries. Indeed the level for Guyana in 1992 is comparable with that which obtained in the 
other countries more than three decades ago. The infant mortality situation is equally bad. At 
a rate of 35 per 1000 births, Guyana's rate is about twice that of Trinidad & Tobago and 
2Vi times that of Jamaica. The mortality rate for children under 5 years old is even worse. 
At 65 per 1000 this is more than thrice the rate in Trinidad & Tobago and more than 316. times 
the rate in Jamaica. 
Data on the number of population per physician and per hospital bed also conform to 
the general health picture. Thus the numbers of population in Guyana are more than 5 and 20 
times higher than those obtaining in Trinidad, respectively. 
Finally, the data on contraceptive prevalence show a very low percentage for Guyana 
(28) as compared with the other territories. Because of the abortion situation and the rapid 
emergence of problems of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, this has serious 
implications for future health delivery. 
The education indicators show comparatively speaking, high rates of literacy and school 
enrollment in all three territories. In recent years, however, there has been marked declines in 
the ratios of trained teachers to total teachers at all levels of education in Guyana. At the same 
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C. Child Mortality 
(Under 5 years) 1992 65 18 20 
D. Primary School Enrollment 
( % ) of relevant age group 1992 98 97 98 
E. Secondary School Enrollment 
(% of relevant age group) 1992 58 74 74 
F. Recurrent Education Expenditure 
(as % of GNP , 1992) 2.0 4.1 5.6 
G. Recurrent Health Expenditure 
(as % of GNP , 1992) 2.8 2.9 2.6 
H. Population ( '000) per Physician 4.7 2.0 0.9 
I. Population ( '000) per Hospital Bed 4.1 0.3 0.2 
J. Contraceptive Prevalence (%) 28 51 44 
Source: Government Statistics (Various Countries), UNDP, 1994. 
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In all three territories, budgetary pressures on education have peaked leading to real 
declines in per capita government recurrent expenditure in education and the introduction of 
various forms of fees and cost recovery measures. The latter has not prevented a decline in the 
quality of educational services being delivered, and surveys indicate that this has impacted itself 
disproportionately on the poor. 
In recent years, Jamaica has spent about 10-12 percent of its recurrent budget on 
education. In Guyana, the 1995 Budget projects a rate of 13 percent and for Trinidad & Tobago 
in recent years it has been 12-14 percent. As shares of GDP, this represents about 5, 4, and 
6 percent respectively for Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. Combined recurrent 
expenditure on health and education in Guyana in 1994 as a percentage of GDP (8.5) was 
better than in Jamaica (7.0 percent) and about the same in Trinidad & Tobago (8.2 percent). 
D. EMPLOYMENT/UNEMPLOYMENT 
Jobless growth and unemployment are at the heart of the Summit concerns. Currently 
unemployment rates in the territories are 11.7 percent in Guyana, 15 percent in Jamaica and 
20 percent in Trinidad & Tobago. These overall ratios, however, conceal important 
variations. 
Thus in Guyana, while 11.7 percent of the population is unemployed, underemployment 
is massive. In the 1992 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) and Household and 
Income Expenditure Survey (HIES) it was established that nationally, the mean number of days 
worked in a 30 day recall period was only 13.7 days. For farmers the mean was staggeringly 
low, 3.1 days. 
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When considered by age group the data also show that in 1992 the unemployment rate 
in the 15-19 years old age group is 37 percent (see Table 4). Table 5 shows the 
unemployment position by age and race. Overall, the rate among Afro-Guyanese was slightly 
higher than that for all races. In the age group 15-19 years, the figure reached as high as 44.4 
percent. Table 6 shows the situation by sex and location. There it can also be seen that 
women predominate in the category of "domestic activities." Most of the unemployment was 
in the rural areas (about 54 percent of the total), followed by urban Georgetown (26 percent). 
Table 4 
Unemployment Rate by Age (Guyana) 
Age/year 1970 1980 1986 1992 
15 - 19 years 51.3 55.5 31.6 36.6 
20 - 24 years 22.0 22.7 20.9 19.5 
25 - 29 years 8.5 9.3 10.5 10.4 
30 - 34 years 5.3 5.7 8.0 6.6 
35 - 39 years 4.1 4.5 5.5 3.6 
40 - 44 years 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.3 
45 - 49 years 3.6 3.4 4.7 2.8 
50 - 54 years 3.5 2.6 2.7 4.0 
55 - 59 years 3.5 2.2 2.1 4.1 
60 - 64 years 3.6 2.4 2.7 1.7 
65 years + 3.5 1.8 4.3 2.2 
Total 15.4 16.8 12.9 11.1 
Sources: 1970 & 1980, Population Census Reports; 1986, 
Labour Market Survey; 1992, HIES. 
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While 11 percent of the labour force is unemployed, about one-half the population aged 
14+ is working. The remainder (38 percent) is involved in domestic duties, school or are 
retired. About 40 percent of the employment is in the informal sector, while about 50 percent 
is in regular salaried or waged employment. The remainder (10 percent) represents casual 
labour. Only 22 percent of Indo-Guyanese women work, as compared to 30 percent for Afro-
Guyanese, and 45 percent for Amerindian women. 
Table 5 
Rate of Unemployment by Age and Race 1992 (Guyana) 





1 5 - 1 9 years 36.1 44.4 36.6 
20 - 24 years 17.6 24.4 19.5 
25 - 29 years 9.7 12.3 10.4 
30 - 34 years 6.4 7.6 6.6 
35 - 39 years 3.5 4.2 3.7 
40 - 44 years 3.3 4.4 3.3 
45 - 49 years 3.0 3.3 2.8 
50 - 54 years 3.0 5.3 4.0 
55 - 59 years 4.2 3.5 4.1 
60 - 64 years 1.9 2.3 1.7 
65 years + 2.7 2.0 2.2 
Total 11.5 13.6 11.1 
Source: HIES, 1992. 
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Table 15 
Population Out of the Labour Force (Guyana) 
Characteristic Seeking Domestic 
Employment Activities 
(%) Only (% ) 
All Guyana 11.1 25.5 
Sex 
Male 62.0 5.5 
Female 38.0 94.5 
Mean age 25.1 34.5 
Area 
Urban Georgetown 25.7 15.1 
Urban Other 14.4 10.9 
Rural Coastal 53.8 66.2 
Rural Interior 6.1 7.9 
100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank, Guyana (1994). 
About 30 percent of the labour force is in agriculture, the highest percentage for the three 
countries. All services combined, including public utilities, transport, storage and 
communication totalled about 40 percent, the lowest figure for the three countries. 
In Jamaica, between Independence and the early 1970's, GDP grew at about 4.4 percent 
per annum, yet unemployment rose from 14 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1972 - a striking 
manifestation of jobless growth. Between 1973 and 1980 the unemployment rate varied around 
20-28 percent. Between 1980 and 1987, it averaged 25 percent. Since 1988, it has fallen to 
about 15 percent. Table 7 shows the link between unemployment and poverty in Jamaica. 
Overall, the lowest unemployment rates occur in quintiles 1 and 5. The reason for quintile 1 
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Table 15 
Unemployment Rates by Consumption Quintile, 1991 (Jamaica) 
Location 1 2 3 4 5 
All Jamaica 9.5 15.6 14.3 15.3 9.2 
Kingston 20.0 22.0 14.0 12.0 6.0 
Other towns 16.0 21.0 21.0 14.0 11.0 
Rural Areas 8.0 13.0 12.0 17.0 13.0 
Source: Dennis Brown, "The Socioeconomy of Poverty in 
Jamaica and Prospects for its Reduction," mss. 
(Kingston, December 1992). 
being so low is that the low unemployment rate in the rural areas (8 percent) masks the existence 
of extensive low paid wage jobs, and subsistence agriculture as the main sources of livelihood. 
In Kingston where the latter phenomenon is not possible on the same scale, the highest 
unemployment rates occur in quintiles 1 and 2. 
Overall, about one-quarter of the employed labour force is in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. The next largest sector is services, not specified. If commerce, public administration, 
transport, public communications and public utilities are combined with this category, the total 
is just over one-half of the labour force. 
Table 8 shows the unemployment rate in Trinidad & Tobago since 1980. The current 
rate is about twice as high as that which prevailed in the early 1980s. Although slightly down 
from the peak of 22 percent over the period 1987-1989, this does not warrant any optimism, as 
the trend since 1991 has been slightly upward, moving from 18.9 percent to 20 percent in 1993. 
The unemployment situation in Trinidad & Tobago is far more serious than the other countries. 
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For the age groups 15-19 years and 20-24 years the respective rates were 43 and 31 percent in 
1992. 
The labour force in agriculture was only 10 percent compared to the other territories. 
Services including transport, storage and communications and utilities accounted for as much as 
60 percent of the labour force, significantly higher than in Guyana and Jamaica. Overall, the 
labour force participation rate was 60 percent. The female rate, however is only 44 percent. 
Women were 37 percent of the labour force. 
Table 8 








1982 9.9 10.1 
1983 11.1 10.5 
1984 13.4 11.5 
1985 15.6 13.4 
1986 17.2 15.4 
1987 22.2 18.3 
1988 22.0 20.5 
1989 22.0 22.1 
1990 20.0 21.3 
1991 18.9 20.3 
1992 19.2 19.4 
1993 20.0 19.3 
Sources: Central Bank, Central Statistical 
Office, Ministry of Finance. 
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E. POVERTY 
Using estimates of consumption derived from the LSMS/HIES surveys as a measure of 
welfare, the World Bank has calculated the three Foster-Greene-Thorbecke (FGT) indexes of 
poverty for Guyana in 1992. These are presented in Table 9, where the data also show the 
regional distribution of poverty. Overall 43 percent of the population is estimated to be below 
the poverty line. This ratio, however, ranges from 79 percent in the rural interior parts of the 
country to 23 percent in urban centres, other than Georgetown. In rural coastal communities, 
the head count index is 45.1 and for Georgetown it is 29 percent. Both the poverty gap and the 
FGTt indexes conform to this general picture. Because the Amerindian communities live 
principally in the hinterland and rural interior areas, this concentration of poverty among a 
particular ethnic community is of particular note. The Amerindians are therefore, correctly 
portrayed as "the poorest of the poor," since of the poorest 20 percent of the population as 
much as one-third are Amerindians. Indeed the data show 87 percent of the Amerindians as 
poor. The lowest percentage is Indo-Guyanese (34 percent). This picture is better revealed in 
Table 10 which shows poverty by ethnic group in Guyana. 
The incidence of poverty by family structure is shown in Table 11. Significantly these 
data do not conform to the widely held view that single parent households, headed by females, 
are among the most vulnerable groups. 
As serious as the situation presented above is, it should be observed that if income is 




Poverty Indices by Geographic Region (Guyana) 






A L L G U Y A N A 100.0 43.2 16.2 8.2 
Urban Georgetown 21.0 28.9 8.7 3.6 
Urban Other 11.2 23.1 6.3 2.5 
Rural Coastal 56.0 45.1 14.7 6.3 
Rural Interior 11.8 78.6 46.1 31.0 
(1) Barima-Waini 3.5 78.9 45.7 29.7 
(2) Pomeroon-Supenaam 6.7 55.0 23.8 12.6 
(3) Essequibo Island-W. Demerara 10.9 45.8 14.9 6.4 
(4) Demerara-Mahaica 39.8 32.0 9.6 4.0 
(5) Mahaica-Berbice 7.5 56.4 18.8 7.9 
(6) E. Berbice-Corentyne 17.0 37.2 9.7 3.3 
(7) Cuyuni-Mazaruni 2.6 44.7 13.4 6.6 
(8) Potaro-Siparuni 1.9 94.8 66.1 49.2 
(9) Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo 3.8 93.3 58.7 39.6 
(10) Upper Demerara-Berbice 6.4 30.9 10.9 4.8 
Note: ^The distribution form the full HIES survey (including all four subrounds). 
Total population is estimated at 730,000. 
Source: World Bank (Guyana), 1994. 
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Table 15 
Critical Poverty Measures by Ethnic Group (Guyana) 
Percent of Head Poverty 
Region Population^ Count Gap FGT, 
A L L G U Y A N A 100.0 27.7 8.9 4.2 
Indo-Guyanese 45.9 33.3 10.3 4.3 
Afro-Guyanese 36.7 43.0 13.9 6.0 
Amerindian 10.3 87.5 53.9 3.6 
Mixed 6.2 44.7 12.7 5.3 
Source: World Bank (Guyana), 1994. 
Table 11 
Incidence of Poverty by Family Structure (Guyana) 
Family Structure, 
Head of Household 
Poverty Measures G$47,500 Poverty Line 






Partner present, w/children^ 53.2 46.6 18.2 9.6 
Single parent, w/children 18.5 47.7 16.4 7.6 
Single parent, no children 16.9 23.9 8.1 3.6 
Partner present, no children 11.4 22.3 7.3 3.3 
Note: ^Classified as unmarried children. 
Source: World Bank (Guyana), 1994. 
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Prior to 1992, the last detailed survey of poverty in Guyana was conducted as far back 
as 1971. In contrast, Jamaica has been well served with an excellent series of living conditions 
and labour force surveys. The integration of these two databases has provided an outstanding 
source of information to aid policy formulation, assess trends and facilitate targeted responses. 
The time series show three broad phases in poverty trends in Jamaica (see Table 12). First, 
there is the period from Independence to the early 1970s when poverty declined because of 
strong growth in bauxite and tourism. Second, from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, poverty 
increased as per capita income and consumption declined with the end of the bauxite and tourism 
expansion. 
Table 12 
Consumption of the Poor, 1958-92 (Jamaica) 
Share of the poor Index of per capita consumption 
(1988 = 100) 
Year 
Bottom Next Al l Bottom Next 
quintile quintile Jamaica quintile quintile 
1958 2.2 6.0 83 34 50 
1971 2.0 5.0 110 41 56 
1975 4.1 9.0 123 94 112 
1984 4.2 9.5 102 80 98 
1988 5.4 9.9 100 100 100 
1991 5.8 10.5 99 106 105 
1992 6.5 10.8 - - -
Source: World Bank (Jamaica) 1994. 
Finally, since the mid-1980s the number of poor persons has fluctuated, with a tendency to 
increase overall. The estimate for November 1992 is that 34 percent of the population was 
below the poverty line. The variation in poverty reflects the variation in GDP and consumption 
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growth in Jamaica. However, the estimates show that the severity of poverty has declined 
somewhat, perhaps reflecting better income distribution, (see Table 13) Thus the FGT, index 
in November 1992 (4.4) was the same as in May 1989, despite the overall increase in the 
percentage of poor persons. 
For the purposes of social policy, the World Bank has estimated the responsiveness of 
the three poverty indexes to changes in mean consumption and the gini coefficient. These results 
are shown in Table 14. They suggest that poverty would decrease faster than increases in 
overall consumption, even if the prevailing degree of inequality was held constant. At the same 
time the reverse would hold true, poverty would increase faster than the decrease in overall 
economic growth, even if the degree of inequality remained unchanged. Since also the 
elasticities are shown to be greater for measures of the severity of poverty, growth which 
maintains the income shares of the poor has particularly favourable effects on the income shares 
of the poor. 
Table 13 














Percent poor 29.8 29.2 26.9 27.9 38.9 34.2 
Poverty gap index 10.0 9.8 8.8 7.9 13.7 10.6 
Poverty severity index 4.7 4.4 3.9 2.9 6.6 4.4 
Source: World Bank (Jamaica), 1994. 
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Table 15 









Al l Jamaica 
PO headcount -1.49 0.84 
P I depth -1.93 2.26 
P2 severity -2.17 3.50 
Source: POVCAL program and 1991 SLC 
data, as cited in World Bank 
(Jamaica) 1994. 
The vast majority of poor houseliolds in Jamaica have at least one person employed, 
highlighting the emergence of the phenomenon of the "working poor". This contrasts with 
the earlier periods when poverty and unemployment were closely joined. About 70 percent of 
the poor live in rural areas where the pervasiveness of poverty is greater. As a consequence the 
World Bank reports that: 
"poverty elasticities show that one percent growth in rural areas is five 
times more effective at reducing national poverty than one percent growth 
in urban areas. Similarly improvements in rural inequality reduce national 
poverty more effectively than improvements in urban inequality" (World 
Bank, Jamaica, 1994, P. 18) 
The geographical incidence of poverty in Jamaica is shown for the period May-June 1989 
in Table 15. On the head count measure, 10 percent of the households in Kingston was poor, 
36 percent for other towns and 41 percent for the rural areas. 
Table 15 









Incidence of the poor 
PO headcount 32.7 10.0 36.1 40.7 
P I depth 10.7 2.2 11.7 13.9 
Distribution of the poor 
PO headcount 100.0 7.0 23.0 70.0 
PI depth 100.0 4.7 22.7 72.6 
Note: P I is calculated as the income-gap ratio times the headcount measure. The 
distribution of the poor is calculated by applying population weights to the 
incidence numbers. 
Source: Dennis Gordon, "Identifying the Poor: Developing a Poverty Line for Jamaica" 
(Planning Institute of Jamaica, 1989) as cited in World Bank (Jamaica) 1994. 
A 1992 Survey of Living Conditions in Trinidad & Tobago, shows 22.5 percent of the 
households surveyed were living below the poverty line. This was significantly up from earlier 
estimates of 14.8 and 18.5 percent as calculated from the Household Budget Survey of 1988. 
While the two sets of data are not strictly comparable, because of the different methodologies 
used, the indication of a worsening poverty situation since 1988 is otherwise supported -
reflecting in large measure, the initial outcomes of the stabilisation phase of the structural 
adjustment process. 
The 1992 data show that while 23 percent of the households are female-headed, 29 
percent of these are poor. For male-headed households the ratio is 21 percent (see Table 16). 
The geographical distribution of poverty is also shown in Table 17. The areas which are well 
above the national average are the Nariva/Mayaro and St Andrew/St David counties (39 and 37 
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percent respectively). Port-of-Spain has a ratio of 29 percent. Overall, the bulk of poor 
persons was concentrated in St George, Caroni and Victoria. 
Table 16 
Gender Distribution of Poverty, 1992: 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Gender Head 
of Household % Poor % of Poor 
Male 21.0 71.3 
Female 29.2 28.7 
T O T A L 
Source: Survey of Living Conditions, 1992, 
as cited in lADB 1993. 
Table 17 
Geographic Distribution of Poverty, 1992: 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Country % Poor 
% of 
Poor 
Port of Spain 29.2 5.5 
San Fernando 18.5 2.0 
Arima 23.1 2.4 
Rest of St. George 21.1 29.9 
Caroni 21.3 17.3 
Nariva/Mayaro 38.7 4.7 
St. Andrew/St. David 37.0 6.7 
Victoria 23.3 17.3 
Point Fortin 5.9 0.4 
St. Patrick 24.6 11.4 
Tobago 13.6 2.4 
T O T A L - -
Source: Survey of Living Conditions, 1992, 
as cited in lADB, 1993. 
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Table 18 below summarizes the poverty measures for the three countries. Clearly the 
situation in Guyana is significantly worse than elsewhere. Paradoxically, however, both the 
strong recent economic growth and the long term natural resource endowments of the country 
already indicated, make it in several ways a better prospect for long term sustainable 
development. This contrast between potential and past performance ought to be a significant 
ingredient in framing policy responses. Certainly, it should encourage greater emphasis on 
medium to long term measures, compared to the present preoccupation with immediate "stop-gap 
and fire-fighting responses". 
Table 18 
Poverty Indexes, Region: 1992 
Index Guyana Jamaica 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
A . Head Count 
(percent poor) 43.2 (66)* 34.2 22.5 
B. Poverty Gap 16.2 10.6 -
C. FGT j 
(Poverty severity) 8.2 4.4 -
Note: 'Using income estimate. 
Source: Previous tables. 
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F. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The discussion in the previous section and the various indexes of poverty summarized 
in Table 18 above, support the view that poverty is at root, an aspect of the broader concerns 
of income distribution in society. Estimates of the percentage share of total income going to the 
lowest and highest quintiles, along with Gini coefficients, are presented for the three countries 
in Table 19 below. The difference in the distribution is quite marked. The income shares going 
to the poorest quintile was lowest in Guyana, and the share going to the highest quintile, the 
highest in Guyana also. The Gini coefficient estimate in Trinidad & Tobago in 1992 was 0.592; 
and the time series data which is available for that country shows that this coefficient has risen 
since 1957/58 (Table 20). 
Table 19 








Guyana 4.3 56.9 42.3 1992 
Jamaica 5.1 49.2 43.5 1989 
Trinidad & Tobago 7.6 39.4 59.2 1992 
Source: E. Greene (1994), World Bank (Guyana), 1994. 
Table 20 
Gini Coefficients: Trinidad & Tobago 
1957/58 1971/72 1975/76 1981/82 1988 1992 
0.430 0.510 0.460 0.450 0.468 0.592 
Source: lADB, Vol. 11, 1993. 
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G: GOVERNANCE 
Three aspects of governance are referred to in this sub-Section; overall political stability, 
which is followed by references to organized crime with international connections, and locally 
sourced crime. 
The wider Caribbean is the world's largest concentration of small and mini-states. The 
Commonwealth Caribbean, as a subset, shares a widespread attachment to the view that on a 
worldwide basis, it exemplifies the tenets of good governance, political stability, multi-party 
political democracy, and racial, ethnic, cultural and class tolerance. Its well documented 
pre-independence history of unrestrained plunder, genocide, slavery, indentured 
immigration, and colonialism, clearly belies this view. And so too, does its less widely 
known, but significant post-independence history of instability. In Trinidad & Tobago there 
have between two armed uprisings against the state since Independence: the "black power," 
1970 uprising and the Muslimeem 1992 insurrection. In Guyana there has been an attempt to 
secede part of the country (the Rupununi revolt of 1969), and nearly two and a half decades of 
disputed elections and authoritarian rule which ended in 1992, with the first "free and fair 
elections" since Independence. In Jamaica, endemic political violence caused nearly one 
thousand deaths during the 1980 election campaign. In so far, therefore, as political stability 
plays a role in social reform, the region still has considerable room for improvement. 
To this evidence of political instability should be added the widely acknowledged 
penetration of these countries with elements connected to the international organized drug 
trade, smuggling, money-laundering, and other forms of white-collar crimes. There are 
local spin-offs in these crimes in that there is evidence of increasing local use of drugs and the 
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practice of white collar crime. 
Locally sourced crimes have also risen dramatically. Thus Trinidad & Tobago reports 
of serious crimes have more than doubled since 1980. These include attacks on women and 
children, both through sexual abuse and domestic violence. The number of persons committed 
to penal imprisonment and sentenced to death has also grown more than four-fold since that date. 
In Guyana, indictable crimes reported have trebled since 1970, while convictions have 
doubled. The rate of murder per 100,000 is 18 which compares unfavourably with less than 
3 per 100,000 in Western Europe and 15 per 100,000 in the United States of America. In 
Jamaica the murder rate is about 25 per 100,000. Several economic reports on these 
countries have singled out crimes as a major deterrent to investment, a push factor in migration, 
and an impediment to the growth of certain key sectors of the economy, especially tourism and 
agriculture. In the latter case, praedial larceny is estimated to account for about one-quarter of 
farm production. Protecting persons and property has also become a fast growing economic 
activity. It is estimated that over 20,000 private security guards are employed in Jamaica, 
through some 200 firms. In addition, many buildings have physical and electronic protection, 
as well as guard dogs. 
The net effect of the above circumstances is to underscore the importance of 
governance and security to the promotion of social reform for deteriorating law and order 
situation encourages migration of the skilled and better-off sections of the population and 
discourages both investment and savings because of the insecurity it fosters. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIAL SITUATION AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS 
The data presented in the previous Chapter offered an empirical description of the social 
situation in the three countries, with reference to a number of important indicators. Such 
empirical information facilitates cross-country comparisons while offering a database for social 
engineering and the targeting of population groups. What is also required however, is an 
analysis of the processes at work in order to provide a dynamic and historicist appreciation of 
their operations. These forces are part of a continuum, for every society is historically formed, 
with the situation today linked to past developments, and containing the seeds of future 
developments as well. 
We cannot pretend in this Report to be able to review all the various interpretations of 
the processes at work, which can be found in the literature on Caribbean society, as limitations 
of both time and space preclude this. Instead, what is offered in this Section is a synthesization 
of the author's own views and others. In the interests of brevity, these are presented in a highly 
condensed form. It should be stressed, however, that the analytical standpoint indicated here, 
informs the choice of policies recommended, and the suggested form of their implementation.^ 
Six key elements define the essence of the processes at work: 
• First, the external environment has played, and continues to play, a fundamental 
role in determining economic, social, political and cultural outcomes in the three 
countries. The Summit itself and the themes it addresses illustrate this, for it has 
played a major catalysing role in placing socio-economic reform so high on 
national agendas. Of course size, location and the historical manner of the 
region's insertion into the global system remains the underlying causes of this 
situation. The relation cited here is, however, asymmetrical. Taking the entire 
region as a whole, the countries are too small to exert significant reciprocal 
influences on the world system, even though, it is unquestionably true that at 
certain historical conjunctures, e.g., the Cold War, they have exerted influence 
disproportional to their size and "weight" in the world economy. 
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Second, the plural bases of the region's culture, exemplified in the description 
of Guyana as a "land of six peoples" cannot be over emphasized, for this 
naturally places ethnic and cultural integration and security high on the priorities 
for social action. 
Third, rigid institutional hierarchies have characterized the historical evolution 
of the three countries. These encompass such "total" institutions as the 
plantation, slavery, indentured immigration, colonial rule and mineral producing 
enclaves. Overall, these institutions served and promoted a material logic in 
which external control of domestic production for external markets prevailed. 
Thus as Thomas (1974) described it, "the territories produced what they did not 
consume and consumed and what they did not produce." It is this underlying 
logic which has guided the use of natural resources, and determined the forms of 
production which has emerged, as well as, the development of science and 
technology, the translation of the societies' needs into the actual demand for 
goods and services, and the distribution of income and wealth. 
Fourth, the institutional hierarchies had two principal features, namely: 
Groups, classes and the various social strata at the apex of the 
hierarchies, have traditionally enforced the exclusion and isolation 
of those at the base; and 
Partly as a consequence, this has encouraged "confrontational" and 
"conflictual" modes for resolving differences. 
These two characteristics explain the frequent references to the potentially 
"explosive" nature of these societies, and hints of a "social time-bomb" if certain 
social matters are not addressed urgently. This fact is underscored by the serious 
poverty and inequitable distribution of income revealed in the previous chapter. 
Fifth, the "exclusion" of the "losers" as referred to above, has three dimensions 
in it: 
One is that it is systemic and not random and disorganized. It 
embraces discrimination along political, economic, ethnic and 
social lines. Worse still, it is internalised in the consciousness of 
many of the poor, as are tendencies to authoritarianism among 
those at the "apex" and of society. 
It has also been situational or conjunctural, as can be seen from 
its recent manifestation during the stabilization phase of the current 
structural adjustment programmes. 
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Finally, it has been operational, i.e., those affected are 
operationally excluded from significant participation in many 
fundamental areas of interaction in the society; markets, the 
political processes and social mobility. 
Sixth, it has produced overall a four-fold typology of poverty. One is the hard 
core of the systemic poor, that is those who are born poor and remain poor over 
their life time, mainly because of the manner of their insertion into the system of 
production and asset ownership. This group reflects historically underdeveloped 
characteristics of these societies. It includes those in low paying jobs (the 
working poor), those who are unemployed without any skills, landless labourers, 
and small farmers with inadequate access to land and credit and who therefore at 
best eked out a subsistence existence. As we saw, this latter group has become 
typical in Jamaica. However, all these groups have been excluded from the 
benefits and resources of the society. 
Another group refers to the newly poor, or structural poor, i.e., those persons 
who while not being born poor, have become poor largely because of the 
stabilisation and adjustment measures being put in place. While this group may 
have had no direct responsibility either for creating the burdensome external debt, 
mismanaging the economy, or causing the external shocks which have befallen 
it, they have had to carry in a traumatic way the burdens of adjustments. Many 
in this category would not have been previously categorised with the traditional 
poor: public servants, teachers and members of the security services. 
There is also the transient poor. The numbers in this group varies from year-to-
year and season-to-season, reflecting in general, the ups and downs of the 
economy and its seasonality of production. The persons in this group would 
therefore vary significantly in terms of their number, form and content. 
Finally, because the poorest of the poor is so heavily concentrated among the 
Amerindian population in Guyana, their special position as a cohesive ethnic 
and social grouping, as well as their historical and ancestral claims require that 
they be recognised as a distinct type. This category, like the systemic poor, have 
been victims of the on-going process of exclusion with its various clusters around 
the rigid hierarchies which have been formed. 
Two further observations are pertinent at this stage. One is that the same historical 
process which has excluded the "losers", has served to institutionalize this factor in all the key 
structures of societies and in all dimensions of social life. This is well illustrated in the case of 
32 
the poor. They have not only been deprived of access to consumption of basic commodities and 
social services, but in one form or another, this is directly linked to their limited participation 
in the productive endeavours of society as well as its major social, cultural and political 
processes. 
Further, for a long list of reasons, (including their recent history, underdeveloped 
institutional capacities, and a lack of the required human resources), none of these societies can 
presently achieve effective, multi-year, centrally directed and state-led social planning, if it were 
so desired. Policy recommendations therefore, have to be largely confined to strategic planning 
and catalysing interventions. We shall argue in the next chapter, that while everything is 
necessary, resources which can be mobilized will only be available for a very few. Critical 
importance therefore ought to be attached to priority assessment, plans for mobilizing the 
"excluded" in the process of social development and seeking to make policy interventions 
sustainable. 
Based on this sort of analysis of the historical processes at work, the primary task of 
social development then becomes two-fold. First, to determine how best to set in train an 
inclusionary/social integrating process which reverses the historical rhythm of exclusion -
isolation - alienation. Second, to seek to find ways of facilitating the movement from social 
inclusionary policies to those aimed at the active mobilisation of those traditionally excluded, 
as the central thrust of social policies and programmes. This two-fold approach to social 
development emphasizes its qualitative difference from social assistance, welfare and traditional 
notions of law and order, stability and good government. 
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From these perspectives, clearly the solutions are long term and will take time. But 
while recognizing this, the emergency aspects of the present situation should also not be 
underemphasized. The long term will not come into being, if the short-term is not 
simultaneously addressed. A good illustration of this nexus is in the case of unemployment. 
Its long term reduction is the ultimate goal but this should be combined with its short-term 
alleviation, since as we have observed time and again sudden unemployment can provoke 
irretrievable damage to the family unit or household, both in terms of its accumulated productive 
assets, and its investments in physical (health) and mental (education) well being. 
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CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS 
This Chapter will present some of the concrete recommendations and proposals which 
follow from the preceding description of the social situation and analysis of the social processes 
at work. In Section I, the analytical framework within which the proposals are made is 
presented. This is followed by a summary statement of the principal proposals now alive in the 
international community (Section II). Sections III - V look at the external environment, issues 
which stem from the present pattern of growth and structural adjustment, and the operations of 
safety nets. Section VI focuses on six priorities for domestic action (small scale farming, 
microenterprises, technical and vocational and training, the legal and institutional framework, 
and identification of the particularly vulnerable population groups). 
I: TYPES OF INTERVENTION REQUIRED 
The interpretation of the causes of persistent poverty presented in this Report stresses the 
linkage of poverty to a process of exclusion and marginalization, which in turn has ethnic, 
cultural and geographical dimensions. These circumstances combine to restrict the ability of the 
poor to join in mutually beneficial "exchanges" in the social, political and cultural spheres of 
the society, or even to share in its economic benefits. Accordingly, poverty alleviation and 
reduction measures should be approached as integral elements of a far-reaching process of 
socio-economic reform. 
As previously indicated, the primary task of such reform is two-fold: 
First, to ensure that the poor not only participate in the production and consumption of 
privately and publicly produced goods and services, but that they also share in the ownership 
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of assets and the distribution of rights, obligations and activities as citizens. Second, to create 
the means whereby those excluded can be mobilized for productive effort, thus forging the basis 
for a new thrust in development policies and programmes. The process of exclusion has been 
both institutionalized and internalized in the consciousness of the poor. 
This approach articulates a definite relation between social planning and social 
development. Because, however, of the undeveloped institutional capacities of the three 
countries, their shortages of skills, and the multitude of social demands being placed on public, 
private and NGO institutions, all are incapable of delivering effective multi-year, centrally 
directed and state led social planning. It is recommended therefore, that social planning 
be confined to strategic planning and catalytic interventions, involving all social sectors. 
While every important social need should be met, we know that they cannot all be, thus 
attaching special significance to priority assessment and determining the scope for interventions 
which are sustainable. 
Interventions which are strategic and catalysing, require certain features: 
• One is to recognize that while social development is qualitatively different from 
social compensatory policies, a balance between the two is essential. Social 
development is long term and is concerned with promoting sustained social 
integration, ethnic security and democratic development in its broadest sense, 
which encompasses more than the traditional concepts of stability and good 
governance as it includes such notions as equality of opportunity. Compensatory 
policies are essentially of a short-term nature. 
• Second, the linkage and complementarities between socio-economic reform, 
macroeconomic performance, and changing production patterns are also 
fundamental. The dynamic interconnectedness of allocative efficiency 
through the market and distributive efficiency through socio-economic reform 
are integral. The task therefore is to promote simultaneously the 
development of socially accountable markets and cost effective equity. 
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Finally, such interventions should be designed to blend lessons learnt from 
experiences elsewhere, with an appreciation of the distinct and concrete 
conditions in each country. Such experience elsewhere indicates a number of 
important guidelines, as for example, the importance of a vibrant civil society and 
the inevitable pressures which socio-economic reforms generate in favour of a re-
structured state. (See U N E C L A C , 1994). 
II: GLOBAL POSITIONS 
The first chapter of this Report argues the importance of supporting the emerging global 
consensus on policy reforms. This consensus is represented here by way of a summary 
statement of the principal recommendations arising from the UNDP 1994 Human Development 
Report and the preparatory Committee meetings for the Social Summit. Although not 
reproduced here, these should be considered in relation to the principal guidelines for action, 
which have been prepared of the Second Caribbean Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 
World Summit on Social Development held on 6-8 December, 1994 ( E C L A C , LC/CAR/G.431). 
The UNDP Report advances a six-point action agenda: 
• The approval of a World Social Charter "as a new contract among all nations 
and all people". 
• A 20:20 compact in which over the next ten years all nations pledge to ensure 
that 20 per cent of national budgets and aid donated will have human priority 
concerns. 
• The establishment of an Economic Security Council in the United Nations to 
ensure protection of all people from social threats to their daily lives, poverty, 
unemployment, drugs, terrorism and so on. 
• A new framework for development cooperation. 
• A global human security fund sustained through various forms of global 
taxation. 
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• A targetted reduction in global military spending of 3 per cent per annum and 
a portion of the savings made available to a global human security fund. 
The preparatory meetings for the World Social Summit have stressed the following seven 
priorities: 
• Creating opportunities for small to medium-sized enterprises by appropriately 
framed incentives (training, credit, market research) and the simplification of 
regulations and procedures as they affect them. 
• Reform of the legal and fiscal framework for governmental action, including a 
clear investment code, nondiscriminatory labour legislation and macroeconomic 
stability. Government's fiscal policies should encourage job creation along with 
growth. 
• Support outward oriented industrial policies and maximum participation in the 
world economy. 
• Facilitate the movement from agriculture to industry, to a dynamic service sector. 
Stress is laid on services arising from environmental protection measures, health 
care, personal services, travel and leisure activities. 
• Improve labour markets through three means: 
i ) an all round emphasis on linking economic growth with jobs, 
i i ) paying special attention to public works projects, job-creating community 
development activities and the training of the work force to make workers 
mobile, and 
iii) implementing ILO conventions to protect workers rights, promote 
occupational health and safety and prevent the exploitation of vulnerable 
groups e.g., child workers. 
• Investment in education and skills promotion. 
• Offering special protection to the vulnerable: women, children, youth neither at 
work nor school, the elderly, the disabled, the homeless and indigenous peoples. 
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All of these recommendations are in principle acceptable and non-contentious. 
Supporting them in the international community would reinforce the basic importance the Region 
attaches to productive and freely chosen employment in a sustainable process of social reform. 
Support for these positions should also be cross-referenced to other recent international and 
regional commitments which are directly related to social development, such as the SIDS 
conference positions and the Caribbean Health Promotion Charter. 
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III: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Not much requires to be said here except perhaps to stress the obvious: without an 
enabling international environment, there is no prospect for global attainment of the Social 
Summit objectives. The Summit itself is driven by concerns over globalization, which it defines 
as: 
"the growing linkage of economic and social policies, trends, even modes 
of behaviour and consumer habits" (World Summit For Social 
Development, Backfounder 1). 
The 1994 Regional Preparatory Meeting agreed that: 
"Throughout its history the Caribbean has been shaped by the external 
world, from its early absorption into international mercantilist economic 
relations to the current uncertainties and dislocations aggravated by rapidly 
changing technologies, increasing competition in a globalized market and 
new forms of absorption into a more liberalized international economy. 
These relationships have left their marks on the social and economic 
landscape as they continue to influence the distribution of productive 
assets and therefore influence human welfare, including the nature and 
extent of poverty in th Caribbean. Cultural and social factors deriving 
from a past, which include the forced entry of Europeans into the 
Caribbean, bringing in its wake the marginalizing of indigenous 
populations where they survived; the enslaving of Africans in the 
Caribbean; and a sprinkling of other ethnic groups (Chinese, Javanese, 
jews, Syrians, Lebanese, etc.). These historical factors, reinforced by 
socio-economic practices, have tended to cause cleavages along racial, 
ethnic, cultural, and class lines. These cleavages have sometimes proven 
to be inimical to development." (ECLAC, LC/CAR/G.431. P . l l ) 
That the successful outcome of the Summit hinges on the prospect for international cooperation 
is therefore, beyond question. However, given the undeniable retreat of countries of the South 
from the positions advanced earlier in their calls for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), the lobby in support of global redistributive measures is to say the least, extremely 
weak. Yet the historical legacy of conquest, genocide, colonization settlement, and the 
widespread use of forced labour are as the document cited above observes, still very evident in 
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the Commonwealth Caribbean. It would appear then that exclusive reliance on the world market 
processes and the trickle down effect of their benefits would be foolhardy. The three countries 
do not participate in the world system on a level playing field. And, based on their present 
economic capacities, diplomatic, political and military leverage they cannot hope to obtain such 
a status in the foreseeable future. There is therefore a real, strategic interest in supporting 
appropriate measures aimed at some form of historical redress. One such measure would be 
indemnifícation and reparations for the ravages of the slave trade and indentured 
immigration. The Summit, with its ethical and social focus, might well be an effective 
forum from which to launch such a sustained demand. 
Such a claim does not negate ongoing efforts aimed at debt relief, better access to 
overseas markets for domestic exports, enhanced opportunities for investment funds and 
improved access to scientific and technical know-how and training. It complements these. 
IV: MACROECONOMIC BALANCE AND GROWTH 
All three countries are in an adjustment mode, which is widely accepted as necessary. 
For those whose primary concerns are the reduction of poverty, increases in employment and 
improved income levels, the critical issue is therefore not whether a structural adjustment 
programme (SAP ) should be introduced, but how measures to restore the major macroeconomic 
balances relate to the choice of development path and to the need for socio economic reforms. 
Matters pertaining to timing, sequencing and the design of policy instruments profoundly affect 
the distribution of the costs and benefits of adjustment. 
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Many people would argue that the separate two-stage implementation of macroeconomic 
and then compensatory measures has worked to the disadvantage of both. Structural adjustment 
has placed disproportionate burdens on those least capable of bearing them, and is one reason 
why migration offers a solution to so many households in the three countries. The paradox is, 
however, that those best placed to migrate have better than average access to productive assets, 
credit and skills. The development of models and policies which integrate the postulates of 
economic behaviour with the variations of social structure, political and power relations as 
they exist would help to give operational content to the simultaneous treatment of the most 
crucial macroeconomic and social variables. 
Allied with this is the need to reconceptualize the linkage between macro, meso and 
micro activities and processes and that between the short-run and long-run. The process of 
learning and innovations would be best facilitated through building up the social partnership 
advocated elsewhere in this Report. In this regard it is recommended that a mechanism be 
established through which interested groups such as labour, business, NGO, consumers, the 
parliamentary opposition, and government can deliberate and advise on policy framework papers 
and related matters. While diverse interests exist, the search for a consensus on key matters 
should be pursued, especially in such areas as the development path, privatisation and external 
debt. 
The existence of an appropriate mechanism for such consultation might encourage an 
independent and autonomous evolution of adjustment theory and practice, thus improving the 
standing of the region in dealing with external agencies and governments. As matters are now, 
the latter overwhelmingly research, conceptualize and design macroeconomic measures. While 
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this reflects their 'financial stake' in the process, it is also facilitated by the limited capacity of 
the region in these vital areas. 
The shortcomings of present policies and the need to give the poor access to productive 
resources require that poverty reduction and income distribution are given more central roles in 
devising strategies and instruments. This is recognised by the World Bank which sees 'well 
targeted programmes for the poor' as the indispensable complement to sustaining growth. This 
needs to be stressed, since prevailing levels of inequality in the distribution of wealth could 
reduce the sensitivity and responsiveness of those below the poverty threshold to growth policies. 
The pursuit of macroeconomic balances is not an end in itself. It has to incorporate the 
seeds of innovation, technical progress and diversification, into what is still exceptionally narrow 
productive bases for all three countries. Over the long run the poor have a vital stake in this 
outcome. 
Finally, an emphasis on socioeconomic reform also invites the reconceptualisation of 
resources. In the three countries, resources committed to social partnership, consensus, 
solidarity, democracy and other such elements of social energy grow and do not diminish 
with use. These resources are derived from the self-mobilisation of people. They are to be 
encouraged and facilitated since they represent an inexhaustible resource, which has barely been 
utilised, hitherto, in society's endeavours. Linking the pursuit of macroeconomic balances and 
economic performance to a socioeconomic reform programme could help to reverse the 
confrontational, hierarchic tendencies which have characterised the social history of the 
region. 
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V: SAFETY NETS 
There are two broad classes of safety nets in the three countries. Those which are locally 
controlled and may or may not be locally financed, and those which are more or less externally 
controlled and financed. Among the former there are three further types: 
• Government operated, which include the traditional line ministries and new 
initiatives which are a direct outgrowth of increasing poverty and the adjustment 
process. 
• Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which span a wide range of activities. 
• Social adjustment agencies like S IMAP in Guyana, which are externally financed 
but controlled locally through a Board which supposedly holds an arms length 
relationship to the government. This is a dedicated anti-poverty organization 
specifically established to cope with the negative social adjustment consequences 
of Guyana's Economic Recovery Programme. 
In what follows in this Section we will seek to highlight the major limitations and weaknesses 
of existing safety net arrangements, since the removal of these impediments would constitute an 
obvious set of priority interventions in the promotion of objectives of the World Summit for 
Social Development. 
Three features characterise their internal social safety nets. One is that much of their 
drive and energy is reactive to the social distress which accompanied the first phases of 
stabilisation policies. They were not originally integral to these latter policies. They were 
brought into existence in a two-stage process, after the social dislocation had become evident 
and compelling in its urgency. This intervention after the event has reduced the effectiveness 
of both the poverty alleviation (social adjustment) measures and the stabilisation policies 
(financial and economic adjustment) measures which preceded them. The second feature of note 
is that all the elements of the social safety nets are underfunded in relation to the needs of the 
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society and the demands which are being placed on them. Third, the capacities of these nets 
among the countries vary considerably, with Guyana's seemingly the weakest and Jamaica's the 
strongest, at least in terms of data availability and capacity for targetted responses. 
Al l the line ministries which operate in the social sectors form part of the government's 
safety net provision. The ministries appear better suited to universal programmes than to such 
discriminatory programmes as would be required for specific targeting of poverty. Their 
financing is also insecure, which not only limits the capacity of the ministries to deliver, but ties 
up a lot of their human resources in intra-governmental competition for resources. Inflexible 
budget procedures further inhibit the capacity of ministries to implement their programmes. Al l 
the ministries suffer from shortages of trained staff. This is in part due to poor salaries, 
compared with what can be earned elsewhere, either locally or abroad. A history of political 
interference in job replacement and promotions in some departments has not helped. Allied to 
the shortages of human resources is the absence in some instances of both the hardware and 
software which goes with efficient social services administration. For example, in Guyana the 
physical disrepair of the capital stock is striking with some ministries not having enough funds 
appropriated to them, to provide for their routine 'other' expenditures. Finally, the low morale 
which is a consequence of all these factors has fostered a certain bureaucratic inertia. 
In sum, the experience since the adjustment measures of the late 1980s suggests that 
in quite a few instances ministries have not been flexible and adaptive enough to cope with 
the circumstances of heightened poverty and severe financial limitations. The ministries 
themselves appear to have lost direction during the 'lost decade'. 
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In relation to the NGOs, the amount of data on the sector is unsatisfactory. Details on 
the levels of assistance received, number of beneficiaries, geographic spread of their operations, 
target groups and so on are not easily available. Many of their difficulties seem to stem from 
the scattered, undocumented and mushroom character of some NGOs, at the present stage of 
development. Inadequate networking takes place. For example, in Guyana there is no umbrella 
organization, not even a regular newsletter. And, because of the structure of party politics in 
the region, a frequent complaint in some quarters is that political elements have penetrated 
community based organisations. This is probably more the case for the more recently created 
'community groups' than for the older and otherwise better established NGOs. 
Despite the above, there is no reason why the widely recognized advantages of 
NGOs, should not be replicated in the three countries. The sector has enormous potential 
for strong "grassroot" links, flexibility, minimal bureaucratic overheads, and a highly 
motivated work force. 
Unlike the line ministries, S IMAP in Guyana is not a specialised institution. It is a 
composite programme operating across large areas of poverty. It is unique in the region, and 
so deserves further consideration because it is being promoted as a model form of a 
dedicated social adjustment agency. Functionally, its activities have been classed as either 
infrastructural rehabilitation and construction, or the provision of social services. But, 
occasionally, both are combined in one location, if not in one project. The former covers a wide 
cross section: roads, schools, markets, health centres, sanitation, water supply, drainage and 
irrigation. The latter also covers a wide area: medical supplies, nutrition, food supplementation, 
education and training, as well as cash transfers to targeted groups such as low wage public 
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service employees, mothers and children who visit health centres, NIS pensioners and so on. 
Its Executive Director has stated that since its inception in 1990 SIMAP has had two 
broad goals, namely damage limitation and the promotion of sustainable development for 
vulnerable groups and individuals. Damage limitation he says, refers to operations designed to 
mitigate the harsh consequences many people suffered from during the stabilisation phase of the 
ERP, while sustainable development refers to efforts to empower individuals, groups and 
communities to become self-providing. 
At the time it was established, it was intended that the agency would operate from the 
bottom-up and be demand-driven, reacting quickly to the needs of the most vulnerable. Its focus 
should be on projects which it was intended would originate from local groups such as 
community organisations, NGOs, local governments, municipalities and regional administrations. 
The agency was conceived to be semi-autonomous in its operation, operating at arms length from 
government while at the same time serving as an outlet for external assistance arising from 
donor/government agreements. This structure, by-passing the traditional line ministries, 
reflected the delicate state of donor-government relations in Guyana at the time of S IMAP 's 
establishment. 
Although S IMAP is premised upon being a bottom-up demand-driven agency, the existing 
NGOs and community organisations have been so debilitated in Guyana that they are not as 
effective transmitters of community needs as they might be. The recent mushrooming of these 
bodies is in fact a supply response to the perceived availability of funds. And although its 
management has striven to be accountable and transparent, suspicion and doubts persist, for it 
is perceived by some as government's 'pork barrel'. Considerable effort is being made to 
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counter this negative perception, as it damages the agency's efforts. Further, several consultants 
have remarked on the agency's over-emphasis on engineering works. (The World Bank 
(Guyana), 1994 reports it employed only one economist and one community development 
specialist). They have also indicated that too much emphasis is being given to the provision of 
inputs and not enough to the delivery of outputs, i.e., the benefits actually received by targeted 
groups. This is important as the capacity of poor communities to deal with inputs and to convert 
them into projects differs widely. 
Finally, as a result of data limitations, the scheme has so far largely operated in the dark. 
This has led to several difficulties. One is that lacking clearly identifiable targets, there is no 
way to measure output effectiveness and therefore monitor the agency's work. Second, the 
agency is not able to readily distinguish between the systemic and structural poor. Third, it 
finds it difficult to operationalise the distinction between its welfare 'damage limitation' functions 
and its contribution to sustainable development of communities. 
Turning to the area of external assistance for poverty relief and reduction several 
weaknesses and limitations are also to be found: 
• The assistance programmes of the various donors appear to be inadequately 
coordinated. This does not mean that individual donors do not evaluate other 
assistance programmes before agreeing to theirs, but the amount of coordination 
between organisations is limited. 
• The donors differ significantly in the areas of project priorities, conditions for on-
granting of funds, and other operational requirements. This lack of standardisa-
tion puts a great deal of burden on the front-line institutions. Additionally, each 
donor has its own standardised perspective of poverty measures within which it 
operates globally, and this may not be sufficiently sensitive to the unique 
circumstances in Guyana. Good examples of the latter are the ethnic differentia-
tion of the population and the proliferation of the very poor in isolated 
communities, as in the case of the Amerindian population. 
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There is insufficient involvement of recipients in the process, at all levels, 
whether it is the host country, the on-granting institution or the target groups. 
This leads to a lack of appreciation of the differing perspectives from which the 
problem has to be addressed. 
It was indicated earlier that the capacities of the safety nets in the three countries vary 
considerably. In concluding this Section, it would be useful therefore, to refer to certain general 
considerations which affect the operations of the safety nets in all three countries. 
The first of these is the dominant role of international factors in the delivery of social 
services, poverty alleviation and reduction measures in the region. Even institutions which are 
termed local, including those in the NGO and government sectors, are overwhelmingly 
dependent on external assistance. 
The second is that the complementary and dynamic linkages between social assistance, 
poverty relief and other short term measures, with the longer term dynamic considerations 
of sustainable development need to be better articulated. As we have noted repeatedly, if 
short term distress is ignored family units in crisis run the risk of being broken up. Poverty 
generates life threatening situations and lead to unacceptable losses of previously accumulated 
investments, e.g., housing, which it would cost a great deal to reverse, even in the long run. 
This can produce social and political instability, loss of hope among important sections of the 
community, and negative expectations about the outcome of long run socio-economic reform. 
The third point is that together, the various elements of the social safety nets are 
inadequately conceptualized in relation to the task of economic reconstruction. This is true 
for all participants, donor as well as beneficiaries. 
Fourth, as a corollary of the above, the causal factors in poverty are not 
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conceptualized adequately and the social safety net institutions are therefore not always 
clear as to what are the root causes of the problem they have to deal with. 
Fifth, in all these institutions, but less so in the case of the NGOs, the role of recipients 
of poverty relief is not central. This limits their effectiveness. 
Finally, the negative impact of a limited data base has been considerable in the past 
especially in the case of Guyana, but far less so in Jamaica. The hope is that recent surveys will 
overcome this drawback and provide the basis for more precise targetting of groups, sub-groups, 
families and individuals. 
The removal of the limitations and weaknesses identified among the various elements of 
the safety nets is an obvious priority for public policy. 
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VI: POLICIES FOR DOMESTIC ACTION 
The proposals in this final sub-Section, are premised on the view, that the provision of 
employment opportunities and productive jobs paying a fair wage is probably the single most 
important way of confronting poverty and promoting social integration. The various surveys 
referred to earlier, reveal high levels of unemployment, underemployment and a proliferation 
of low productivity and low wage jobs in the three countries. Self-employment in the small farm 
sector also reveals a similar low productivity and low net returns. 
The central role proposed here for productive employment is consistent with experience 
world wide and the emerging pre-Summit consensus. Clearly this goes beyond amelioration of 
distress and offers a means of sustainable escape from poverty. Additionally, it promotes other 
social benefits such as enhanced social mobility, along with increased geographic and 
occupational movement and differentiation within the workforce. This could contribute to the 
breakdown of the observed concentration of ethnic groups in particular occupations and regions 
in the three countries and so enhance social integration. Education and training of the labour 
force would also raise productivity and help internalize technological progress and diversification 
of the production structure. Simultaneously, it opens up the prospect for identifying and seizing 
economic opportunities as they emerge. 
Several aspects of productive job creation will be briefly tackled in this sub-Section 
namely: 
A ) Labour Market Organisation. 
B) Small Scale Farming. 
C ) Microenterprises. 
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D) Education (Non-formal, Informal and TVET) . 
E) Legal and Institutional reform. 
F ) Special Population Groups to be Targeted. 
A: Labour Market Organisation 
While it is generally acknowledged that government's intervention in the three countries' 
labour markets is minimal, this should not lead to the unwarranted conclusion, that the 
Government should keep out of the market. Hard times have thrown children and women on 
to the job market and they need to be protected. Furthermore, the existence of numerous 
unregulated and supervised job sites in the sweat trades, exporting processing zones, and in 
Guyana remote mining and forest areas, require that national standards are laid down and 
enforced, particularly in such areas as ctiild labour, occupational healtti and safety, 
working hours, and national insurance coverage. 
An effective and efficient labour market information system is also a high priority as 
existing arrangements, while varying in their efficiency has much room for improvement. For 
example, in Guyana there is a long list of data which are regularly needed but are not published. 
There is no accessing and publication on a timely basis of the socio-economic features of 
employment, occupational/industrial/wage and salary structures, projections of supply and 
demand, training needs, or in some instances, even a directory of occupations. There is also 
no national standard industrial classification system or classification of non-formal T V E T 
arrangements. 
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There exists in the territories no national agency with the capacity to promote the level of public 
awareness, vocational guidance and counselling required by young persons about to enter, 
or already in the labour market. 
The minimum wage set by governments in the region plays a key lead role in guiding 
wage and salary payments country-wide. Its influence is not confined to those who receive it. 
Targetting the minimum wage to poverty lines and household composition data along with 
proper indexing could therefore perform a useful function in approaching a fair wage standard. 
Because of transportation difficulties and widely varying social conditions a special 
incentive system for workers in difficult locations should be promoted nationally. This could 
include fiscal incentives, preferential access to housing after tours of duty in "hardship" areas 
or salary and wage premia payments. 
Finally, an urgent priority is for each country to establish a precise timetable for 
ratifying all ILO conventions. 
B: Small Scale Farming 
Survey data show that in all three countries, although of varying significance a number 
of major constraints prevent the sustainable development of the small farming sector. Many of 
these constraints have grown out of the historical predominance of plantation and large estate 
production in relation to small scale farming with limited resources. Among the key ones are: 
• Land tenure and access. Problems of land titling and poor access of small 
farmers to land well located in relation to major roadways, the suitability of its 
terrain for farming, in terms of slope, soils and water access, and protection 
against praedial larceny are quite acute. In addition, there has been an historical 
tendency to land fragmentation. 
53 
Poor water management and soil conservation facilities. 
A limited diversification of production lines. 
Low productivity because of low levels of technical competencies of the farming 
community and access to technology. 
Weak rural organizations. 
Weak research and extension services. 
Unwillingness of the young to enter farming. 
Deteriorated access roads and other such support facilities (e.g., markets and 
storage). 
Limited access to credit. 
Difficulties of marketing and pricing. 
In general, these have resulted in either low farmer productivity, low net returns to total 
assets employed in farming, or high underemployment of farmers. These circumstances have 
reinforced the psychological unwillingness of young people to enter into farming, resulting in 
a major inter-generational problem as the farming population is on average, relatively aged. 
Concurrent with the above, structural adjustment measures have introduced new and 
important dynamics to this process: 
Market liberalisation of major export crops. 
The elimination of the monopoly positions of state agricultural marketing boards. 
The progressive removal of tariffs on agricultural produce. 
The elimination of food subsidies. 
Divestment of state lands. 
Encouragement of foreign investment or management in agriculture, especially 
in traditional export crops like sugar. 
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These policies have impacted on the small scale farming community but not generally in 
a positive way, as it has tended to highlight the "survival" aspects of small scale farming. Thus, 
Newman and Le Franc observe from their study of an established small farming community in 
Clarendon, Jamaica: 
"There are some more general conclusions to be drawn from this exercise 
and these have specific implications for possible development policy 
options. From the discussion above it can be seen that although well 
integrated into the formal productive sectors the small farm sector survives 
by functioning as 'informal' ones are often said to function. Guided by 
small principles of reciprocity, residence, and responsibility, the available 
factors of production as well as any other source of income such as 
remittances from abroad are manipulated so as to ensure some degree of 
individual survival and even advancement. Family relationships then 
become another resource which can be manipulated to a given end. The 
dark side of this is that longer term expansion or development into a large 
commercial operation rarely occurs." (Newman and Le Franc, 1994, 
P. 180) 
There are f o u r major recommendations which flow from these circumstances. 
First , and foremost, the small scale farming sector should not be treated as just a "sub-
sector" needing welfare and state support. The focus has to be o n s trengthen ing its capac i ty 
to participate effectively in both the local "free" markets being developed under structural 
adjustment and the outward orientation of the economy towards international 
competitiveness which is also being encouraged. Indeed Newman and Le Franc's work clearly 
indicates that a poverty alleviating and safety net approach would not work: 
"The main policy implication here is that if assistance is to be given to 
this sector, a simple 'poverty alleviating and safety net approach' which 
seeks to make life a bit easier until the benefits of Structural Adjustment 
take effect, is likely to yield little result", ( ib id , P. 181) 
Second, to achieve this result radical land reform measures have to be undertaken or 
accelerated where this has already begun. Indeed in Guyana, a routine issue like land tilting 
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is considered to be one of the biggest obstacles in the small farm sector. Detailed proposals 
have already been made for such programmes e.g., the FAO proposals on Guyana, and what 
is required, the political will to implement them. Without improved access to production assets 
the small farmer will remain locked into poverty. 
Third, publicly financed improvement in infrastructure and support services, 
particularly in such areas as water management, soil conservation, research and extension is a 
clear priority. While much of this will be dependent on external support,whether in the form 
of technical assistance or financing, national governments themselves have a duty to recognize 
this priority in their budgetary provision. 
Finally, overall improvements in rural organization, as well as the skills, education 
and awareness among the rural population are vital ingredients for a successful outcome. 
Solutions in this area will be heavily dependent on self-help, cooperative and community based 
activities in various NGOs. Both in Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, vibrant rural based NGOs 
have already been promoted. 
C: Microenterprises 
The contributions which micro and small enterprises can make to economic expansion 
with jobs are widely recognized, and do not require to be repeated here. Indeed, the Summit 
has already taken this priority on board recognizing also that this sector can be an important 
vehicle for social integration. The purpose for introducing it here is to stress certain aspects of 
this proposal which bear directly on the circumstances to be found in the three countries. Again 
it should be emphasized that the degree of importance varies from country to country, but 
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remains overall quite significant. 
A number of observations about the microenterprises sector in the three countries can be 
made: 
Often it suffers in not having the macroeconomic, legal, regulatory and 
institutional environment sufficiently responsive to its needs as compared w îth 
large foreign enterprises. This frequently combines with official intolerance and 
unnecessary bureaucratic delays. 
It requires considerable upgrading of its technical, marketing and managerial 
know-how. The level and quantity of equipment in use is often not well suited 
or the best available. 
Lack of access to affordable and flexible credit is a critical deterrent to its 
improvement. This is partly related to the inadequate collateral held by the sector 
as it has little real estate, can find few who are willing to stand guarantor for its 
operations, and lacks a track record in banking. 
It suffers disproportionately from the break down of, or poor public utilities, as 
it cannot afford back-up supplies. 
Its operations are plagued with high cost and unreliable inputs. 
An important area of the microenterprises sector is the s treet e c o n o m y in urban 
and commercial areas, which is one of the fastest growing areas of employment 
in Guyana. It is an important means of livelihood as well as an important 
learning ground for entrepreneurial development. There are instances, however, 
of official intolerance, based on the unproven assumption that operators in this 
sector are more dishonest than large businesses. There is a tendency also to 
underdue the fact that they fulfill real social needs, which is the basis of their 
existence. (Thomas, 1994.A.) 
Following from the above a major policy initiative should be undertaking and/or updating 
surveys from which policy makers and activists in this sector would establish: 
• Operational definitions and empirical descriptions of the sector in the three 
countries. 
• The appropriateness or otherwise of the macroeconomic, legal, regulatory, and 
institutional environment in which these enterprises operate. There is some 
considerable evidence that many rules and regulations which are taken as 
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necessary, are so designed as to inhibit the growth of this sector. 
• The level and nature of the services which the sector demands. 
• Available supply, and its likely evolution in relation to the demand. 
The provision of "extension services" to this sector as well as the systematic involvement 
of development NGOs are already recognized priorities. It should however, be stressed that the 
very informal, under-institutionalized and highly variable character of microenterprises seem to 
make them particularly well suited for involvement with the bottom-up organizing principles of 
NGOs. 
D: Education: Non-Formal, Informal & TVET 
The crucial role which education and human resource development generally can play in 
an attack on poverty has been widely acknowledged in all the "prepcom" meetings for the 
Summit. This is also endorsed in this Report. The specific aspect however which is treated 
here is the role of non-formal and informal institutions in this process. This has been somewhat 
overlooked, but has a strong complementary role to play along with the formal structures in any 
sustainable attack on poverty. 
There is a wide range of such inst i tut ions in the three countries. N o n - f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n 
is a vital link between human resource development and socioeconomic reform, because it 
provides: 
learning skills beyond the scope of the formal structure and so helping to close 
the "job gap"; 
mechanisms for extending skills and knowledge gained in the formal system; 
a means of countering distortions in the formal system; 
what is in some communities often the only available educational and training 
opportunities, and in others an alternate route for those who may for one reason 
or another (poverty, aptitude, wrong social attitudes) have become the "drop-
outs" and "left-outs" of the formal school system; 
opportunities for innovation which the more structured formal system may fail to 
provide. 
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I n f o r m a l tra in ing covers "on-the-job" type training and training for indigenous skills and 
handicrafts. 
Thomas (1992. A . ) lists seventeen major categories of institutions which provide technical 
and vocational education and training ( T V E T ) in one form or another in Guyana. While several 
of these are in the non-formal sector, it can be found in all the main sectors and at all levels of 
education after the primary. Despite this large number, the system exhibits many limitations and 
weaknesses. It is complex, if not complicated, overlapping and uncoordinated. There is no 
standardisation of certification, course content, entry requirements, trainers qualifications, or 
even length of training. Furthermore, it is still perceived as "low status" education offered to 
those not bright enough to follow the mainstream academic programmes of the formal system. 
This is frequently combined with a strong gender bias against women pursuing certain "male" 
areas of technical skills. 
A close assessment, however, shows that institutions providing these types of education 
have many un-recognized advantages: 
• They are flexible in their financing arrangements, both as regards sources of 
financing these activities and the modes of payment for the services which they 
provide. 
• They are also flexible in the length of time in which learning takes place, through 
wide and flexible variations in the intensity of courses. 
• They employ flexible teaching techniques ranging from apprenticeship to long 
distance correspondence courses. 
• They provide high individual returns for those utilizing their services. 
They have considerable scope for economic returns derived from better 
standardization of their curricula, methods of certification, course material used, 
teaching staff and teaching techniques employed. 
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• They are also flexible in the way in which they can be combined with other types 
of education. 
• Finally, they can be sponsored by a wide variety of institutions, ranging from 
NGOs to the private businesses and government structures. 
Based on the diagnosis given above the following recommendation is made: 
The urgent establishment of a regional and national facility to coordinate all forms of 
T V E T both industrial and in-plant. This recommendation has been made before, but not enough 
has been done. This facility does not have to be overly bureaucratic, but should bring together 
the major stakeholders: government, business, NGOs, labour, farmers, regional and international 
bodies. Its objectives should be to secure: 
curriculum reform, the upgrading of course offerings, and the introduction of new 
ones; 
a reduction in the ad hoc characteristics of the present system and a far greater 
consolidation of the wide range of formal, non-formal and informal arrangements; 
better linkages between TVET institutions and their users; 
the systematic training of TVET trainers; 
the rationalization and improvement of T V E T training facilities and programmes; 
the integration and rationalisation of the needs of various sectors so as to avoid 
duplication and wastage. 
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E: The Institutional Framework 
The types of strategic interventions recommended in this Report should be supported by 
at least f o u r fundamental institutional changes which are indicated below. Although given 
separately they are all closely related, in that each contributes to the re-definition of state-society 
relations in a modern context, and accepts the principles of social development advanced in this 
Report. The proposed changes are: 
i) The re-structuring of the state, its functions and modalities of operation. 
This includes constitutional reform but embraces two further ideas. One is 
promoting the development of a participatory political culture which supports 
tolerance, trust and transparency in the conduct of public affairs and the other is 
the need to decentralize and "de-concentrate" the state. 
ii) Mechanisms should be institutionalized to promote an effective social 
p a r t n e r s h i p a m o n g the key sectors of society. This would bring considerations 
such as consensus building, equality of opportunity, and the special position of 
disadvantaged groups to the forefront and help to undermine the confrontationist 
and authoritarian legacies of the past. Thus regional initiatives like the Caribbean 
Social Charter should have definite legal obligations and permit resort to judicial 
processes to secure their enforcement. 
iii) To set social targets for institutions based on t ime-or iented quant i ta t ive targets . 
For example, stated percentage declines in unemployment, the Gini coefficient, 
mortality and morbidity, school enrollment and repetition rates, and budgetary 
targets for the social sectors. These targets should be based on catch-up 
principles and related to appropriately determined norms, defined in terms of 
actual achievements elsewhere. 
iv ) Some of the weaknesses of the traditional public service in regard to poverty 
alleviation that were referred to earlier in the Report explain the consistent calls 
by all observers for more and better targetting of poverty relief, improved micro-
management, more scope for local employment, more transparency and greater 
involvement of recipients in the design, implementation, and monitoring of 
"relief" and "developmental" programmes. Similar limitations have emerged in 
relation to macroeconomic management, as well as in relating to citizens whether 
as individuals or groups. As part of the various SAPs, a process of public service 
reform, to varying extent in the three countries, has started. There is, however, 
a special urgency in speeding-up this process and achieving more fundamental 
changes than those proposed so far. 
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F: Target Population Groups 
In this final sub-Section our concern is simply to d r a w a t t ent ion to the par t i cu lar 
population groups which are in need of special initiatives and programmes. The principle 
behind this proposal is not new. Indeed it is already recognized in the three countries. Thus 
for example, in Trinidad & Tobago there are special programmes for youth, the homeless and 
drug abusers. In Jamaica, there are special programmes for small farmers, women and small 
businesses. While in Guyana, there are targetted programmes for the indigenous population, 
pensioners, and the disabled. Generally, these initiatives are focussed on ensuring the social 
integration of these groups in the society through the enhancement of opportunity to participate 
in society as groups with equal standing in relation to others. Al l these groups, suffer from 
special disadvantages and face the prospect of increasing marginalization in the economic, social, 
political and cultural interchanges in the society. Many of the proposals and recommendations 
made in this Report would have effects across all these categories. For example, employment 
promotion would cut across all population groups; targetted health and nutrition programmes for 
school children would affect both genders and all parts of the country; land reform and 
microenterprise promotion would help farmers, rural producers, urban entrepreneurs, the 
consuming public, and women groups. 
Based on the survey of the current social situation already presented and recognizing that 
resources are not available for addressing all problems of all groups immediately, the suggested 
priorities are: 
• W o m e n a n d ch i ldren , because of maternal and child health care concerns, 
particularly noticeable in Guyana, the stress being placed on women for caring 
children and as emerging entrepreneurs in periods of acute economic distress; 
and, the importance of an educated and skilled workforce based on a sound 
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system of education, adequate nutrition and a supportive environment for children 
to grow up in. 
• Y o u t h , because of the dominance of young people within the population 
structure;their limited roles in the key decision-making structures of the society; 
the disproportionate burden of unemployment which they carry; and, their 
exposure to, and significant involvement in, such regional pathologies as drugs, 
crime, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and abortions. 
• Sen ior c i t izens , who are a minority particularly traumatized by inflation 
depressed incomes, and retrenchments in the public sector, and the consequent 
erosion of their savings accumulated over a life-time of work, much of it spent 
in the first few decades of national independence. 
• The d i sab led , who are a traditionally ignored group but whose plight, because of 
their personal and family circumstances, is often worsened through difficulties in 
accessing education, jobs and medical care. Estimates indicate a prevalence rate 
in the three countries of approximately 10 percent. 
• The i n d i g e n o u s A m e r i n d i a n c o m m u n i t i e s in Guyana, because all three countries 
form part of their ancestral homes, and against whom genocide has been 
practised. The need for historical redress is compelling. 
63 
N O T E 
1. This Section draws on Thomas 1994.B. See also Thomas, (1995). 
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